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It is argued that the slingshot argument does not soundly challenge 
the truth-maker correspondence theory of truth, by which at least 
some distinct true propositions are expected to have distinct truth-
makers. Objections are presented to possible exact interpretations 
of the essential slingshot assumption, in which no fully acceptable 
reconstruction is discovered. A streamlined version of the slingshot 
is evaluated, in which explicit contradiction results, on the 
assumption that identity and nonidentity contexts are purely 
extensional relations, effectively establishing the intensionality of 
identity. !
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1. Logical David Against a Truth-Maker Goliath !
The slingshot argument purports to refute the standard correspondence 
theory of truth, in its requirement that there be distinct truth-makers for at 
least some distinct true propositions. The slingshot is supposed to 
accomplish this feat by proving from minimal logical means in a purely 
extensionalist environment that all true sentences must correspond to a 





 This way of explaining the slingshot argument’s consequences for truth-maker theory 1
was first articulated by Davidson, speaking of ‘The Great Fact’ [1967; 1990]. 
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Originally suggested by Gottlob Frege, according to Alonzo Church, and 
later articulated by Kurt Gödel, slingshot arguments have been developed 
for different philosophical purposes by Donald Davidson. The general 
style of inference was designated slingshot by Jon Barwise and John 
Perry, in honor of the argument’s simplicity and use of minimal primitive 
resources in achieving exceptional conclusions. Slingshots have been 
more recently discussed, among others, by W.V.O. Quine, Dagfinn 
Føllesdal, Stephen Neale, James O. Young, James Levine, Graham Oppy, 
Yaroslav Shramko, and Heinrich Wansing. The slingshot argument, like 
most interesting philosophical controversies and positions, in any of its 
forms, has both loyal adherents and ardent opponents.  2!
2. Formalizing Slingshot Reasoning !
There are several formulations of the slingshot argument. For 
convenience, we consider a common composite version based on four 
assumptions. The truth assertions of propositions p and q in assumptions 
(1) and (2) require no comment. Assumption (3) states that a is identical 
to the object identical to a and proposition p [is true]. What this further 
means is the subject later of more penetrating criticism. The slingshot is 
first drawn back and made ready to release: 
(1) p 
(2) q 
(3) a = ιx[x = a ∧ p] 
If p = Fx, closed by the definite descriptor, then step (3) can be 
instantiated as a = ιx[x = a ∧ Fa]. The argument now proceeds by further 
supposing that: 
(4) The truth-maker of p ≠ the truth-maker of q 
The truth-makers of p and q are posited as different facts. Both truth-
making facts for propositions p and q happen to exist or obtain, such that 
the material equivalence p ↔ q is contingently true. From the presumed 
extensionality of (3), and the fact that where p and q by hypothesis are 
both true, it follows by truth table definition that p ↔ q, it is deduced 
that, substituting q for p in the purely extensional definite description 
context in (3) implies:  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(5) a = ιx[x = a ∧ q] 
Transitivity of identity with (3) and (5) now delivers: 
(6) ιx[x = a ∧ p] = ιx[x = a ∧ q] 
The ιx[x = a](= a) component of (3), (5), and (6), however, is logically 
equivalent to a = a, which, as a trivial logically necessary truth that 
follows from the universal reflexivity ∀x[x = x] condition on identity, 
drops out of consideration as among the truth-makers for ιx[x = a ∧ p] 
and ιx[x = a ∧ q], logically reducing (6) to: 
(7) For any type distinct true sentences or propositions p, q, the 
truth-maker of p = the truth-maker of q 
Since (7) contradicts (4), the reductio is interpretable as showing that the 
truth-makers of any distinct true propositions are always identical rather 
than ever distinct.  There are supposed to be surprising philosophical 3
consequences resulting from slingshot arguments. However, what these 
are and whether and in what sense they might hold on the basis of the 
slingshot is sometimes even more hotly contested than whether in fact the 
slingshot works at all.  4!
3. Stipulative Identity, License and Regulations !
Formulated as in (1)-(7), it is hard on reflection to see how the slingshot 
argument could have ever been taken seriously. Several objections to the 
argument have been proposed, including Gödel’s suggestion that the 
inference does not go through when steps (3) and (5) are properly 
reformulated according to Russell’s analysis of definite descriptions.  5!
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 The comparable formalization in Neale, [1995], 789-790, regarded by many as 3
definitive, similarly depends on an identity, derived by means of his specific formal 
principle of ι-INTRO, in which the scope of the definite descriptor explicitly indicates 
that being the identical to object a is conjoined with a predication: [4] a = (ιx)(x = a ∧ 
Fx).
 Dissenting voices equally underwhelmed by the slingshot argument include especially 4
Oppy [1997].
#  Gödel’s solution involving Russell’s theory of definite descriptions is a variation of the 5
proposal offered here that merely appeals to Leibniz’s Law independently of Russell’s 
analysis. Russell’s translation of the definite description in (3) and (4) by itself does not 
solve the problem without further appeal to the indiscernibility of identicals, and the 
solution involving Leibniz’s principle does not require or logically depend on Russell’s 
analysis. Thus, the argument is avoided if steps (3) and (5), in our notation, are translated 
into Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions as follows: 
(3R) a = ∃x[x = a ∧ p ∧ ∀y[y = a ↔ x = y] ∧ p] 
(5R) a = ∃x[x = a ∧ q ∧ ∀y[y = a ↔ x = y] ∧ q]
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The slingshot depends essentially on a free exercise of stipulative 
identities. It applies relatively elementary logical principles together with 
modest conventional assumptions governing the identity relation in 
supposedly purely extensional logical contexts to define a universally 
generalizable identity statement, ostensibly concerning any propositional 
object a that is shown to require all facts or one all-inclusive cumulative 
fact as its do-all truth-maker. The difficulty in the argument is 
nevertheless apparent in a question that seems seldom if ever to have 
been asked, as to whether object a could possibly or intelligibly be 
defined as in (3), regardless of whether or not the truth-maker of p = (or 
≠) the truth-maker of q. 
The slingshot is supposed to involve primitive means to achieve an 
impressive counter-semantic end. The slingshot certainly embodies 
something interesting. The question is, What? Whatever is going on in 
step (3) in the slingshot argument is by no means primitive or naïve, but a 
rather peculiar specially designed application of logical notation to 
proclaim an identity, and more especially the identity of a propositional 
object conjoined with any arbitrarily chosen true proposition. Even in 
Neale’s systematization of what he calls Gödel’s slingshot, built up 
constructively from the predicate assumption that Fa, by means of 
definite descriptor syntax introduction and elimination, ι-INTRO and ι-
ELIM, a formula is produced that we do not actually need beyond Fa. 
Neale does not merely introduce a definite descriptor from Fa, as would 
plainly suffice, such as ιx[Fx] and allow a = ιx[Fx], or, say a = 
ιx[λy[Fy]x]. Rather, ι-INTRO is so designed that it takes any harmless 
predication directly into a form of the slingshot, by the principle that a = 
ιx[x = a ∧ Fa]. We do not need such formulations to be able to express 
constant and definite descriptor predications of properties to things. Nor 
are they firmly planted conceptually. Even if a has property F, it does not 
follow that a is identical to the having of property F, or even of being 
identical to a, if objects possessing properties are in any sense distinct 
from the properties they possess. The slingshot argument is hard to take 
seriously largely because of its preposterous identity stipulations, as in ι-
INTRO. Nevertheless, if ι-INTRO can be built with what comes in the 
box, and what is not already included can be freely stipulated for logic to 
work with constructively, then logic and philosophy of logic must 
consider the consequences. 
Stipulation is a sometimes indispensable instrument, but one that can also 
be too powerful for its own good. Sayso definition oversteps its bounds 
when it violates more firmly established logical principles, or trivializes 
what would otherwise be philosophically interesting implications. 
Bidding true identities into existence by means of logical syntax is not 
unrestricted, and should never be allowed to stray beyond the limits of 
logical consistency and such general significance requirements as 
noncircularity. In the slingshot argument, we cannot freely stipulate that  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identities hold in flagrant violation of the predicative laws of logic, 
particular noncontradiction and excluded middle. We can only do so if we 
can independently make a strong brief against conventional identity 
principles, with disregard for the requirements of identicals prescribed by 
some form of Leibniz’s Law, and invoking more especially a version of 
the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. !
4. Supplementing Identity with Truth !
Let us consider more scrupulously what happens in slingshot step (3). 
Although the argument’s inference principles themselves are minimal, 
there is nothing primitive or naïve about the identity statement on which 
the slingshot turns in this essential assumption. The slingshot itself might 
be a crude device, but the stone it casts in this sophisticated application is 
cleverly designed as something more like a logical smart missile. 
Putatively, a is declared in the formula at (3) to be identical to ιx[x = a ∧ 
p]. Does this make sense? It looks to casual inspection as though in (3) α 
is being identified with something other than itself, with a and the 
proposition p, or perhaps the truth-maker of or state of affairs that p. We 
describe the x such that x is identical to a and p [is true], whereby object 
α is said to be identical to a and or such that p is true. We may find 
ourselves at a loss to understand whatever this could mean, unless a = p. 
That object a should turn out to be identical to proposition p is not 
necessarily problematic in and of itself. Propositions are also objects, and 
as such are included in the set of all objects of reference in thought and 
language in the logic’s referential domain. They can appear as predication 
relata in true or false identity statements. It must therefore be questioned 
whether we can freely add true propositions to an object’s identity 
conditions without thereby replacing reference to one object with 
reference to another distinct object. We would then be proceeding 
equivocally and hence fallaciously referring to two distinct intended 
objects before and after the replacement by the same propositional object 
name ‘a’ in the respective expressions. We can only proceed more 
charitably on the generous hypothesis that slingshot step (3), in order to 
be true, entails that a = p. 
The slingshot encounters a dilemma at just this point. The question is the 
legitimacy at step (3) of identifying object α as the object identical to the 
conjunction of α and proposition p. Propositions, at least in the sense of 
sentence types in which the existence of a state of affairs is proposed, 
have identity conditions and are identical to some and not to other things, 
just like any other recognized category of entities. The only thinkable 
circumstance under which α could be identified with both the thing that is 
identical to a and conjoined with the proposition or truth-maker of 
proposition p, is presumably, as previously suggested, that in which a  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itself is a proposition, and, in fact, in which a is identical to proposition p. 
Truth functionally, only propositions can be conjoined together by the 
truth function ∧. If a is identical with proposition p, then it could truly be 
extensionally identical to unlimited numbers of self-conjunctions, as we 
see when (3) is instantiated in a true application as: p = p ∧ p. Else, if a ≠ 
p, then in (3) we might as well try to identify a pig with a pig and a cow. 
If a = p, on the other hand, and if, as slingshot step (4) requires, the truth-
maker of p ≠ the truth-maker of q, if p and q have different truth-makers, 
then it must follow that p ≠ q, even if p ↔ q. Although it is logically 
possible for p and q to have the same truth-maker even if they are two 
distinct propositions, p ≠ q, if p and q have different truth-makers, they 
evidently cannot be identical propositions, and we must conclude in this 
second dilemma horn that p ≠ q. From p ≠ q and p ↔ q, however, in an 
inference considered in greater detail below, it immediately follows by 
substitution of material equivalents p ↔ q in the presumed purely 
extensional nonidentity context p ≠ q, that p ≠ p and q ≠ q. 
This is an outright paradox, if we assume as standardly that identity is a 
minimally reflexive relation. The slingshot is not generally presented as a 
blatant logical antinomy, but as a logically consistent refutation of the 
correspondence theory of truth, contradicting the proposition reductio ad 
absurdum that distinct true propositions are generally made true by 
distinct truth-making state of affairs. The present objection proves that 
slingshot assumption (3) must finally be false, and hence that the 
argument does not soundly support the refutation of reductio target 
assumption (4) on the backs of otherwise true assumptions. The point is 
that the falsehood in the resulting contradiction in the proof can as well 
be accounted for as a consequence of the falsehood of assumption (3), 
and not exclusively because of the falsehood of assumption (4), that with 
(1)-(3), the truth-maker of p ≠ the truth-maker of q. The reductio does not 
warrant rejecting the proposition that different propositions generally 
have different truth-makers, even if they share the same truth-value, 
because the contradiction can be attributed instead to the expansion in 
assumption or inference step of p or Fa in assumption (1), and with 
something like Neale’s ι-INTRO supporting (3) in the background, so 
that it need not be taken as an assumption in addition to Fa (and Gb). If, 
contrariwise, slingshot step (3) is not meant to be true by stipulation, if it 
is simply an expression that could just as well be false, and if indeed it is 
demonstrably false, as we have just observed, then the slingshot argument 
in the forms we have considered does not represent sound reasoning 
undermining the correspondence theory of truth. The inference is not 
sufficiently powerful, given problems in the argument’s other 
assumptions, to collapse the truth-makers of every true proposition into a 
single massive internally indivisible truth-making state of affairs. 
!
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5. Extension to Neale’s Formulation !
The problem is easily extended to recent popularly accepted slingshot 
formulations. Neale, to look more closely now at his reconstruction, in 
what might be considered the definitive statement of slingshot reasoning, 
assumes this starting-place, in his essay, ‘The Philosophical Significance 
of Gödel’s Slingshot’: 
[1] Fa 
[2] a ≠ b 
[3] Gb 
Etc.  6
If a ≠ b, then Fa ≠ Gb. By truth tables, it follows as before, this time from 
[1] and [3], that Fa ↔ Gb. Hence, the dire consequence once again 
obtains that Fa ≠ Fa and Gb ≠ Gb. The problem is not that eventually 
Neale lands the argument in contradiction. As a reductio demonstration, 
that is its destination. The problem is that contradiction is reached too 
soon in the reconstruction. 
Neale allows intersubstitution of material equivalents (not merely logical 
equivalents) in identity and therefore nonidentity contexts. If Fa and Gb 
are true, and if a ≠ b, then it follows first that Fa ↔ Gb, and then, as 
indicated, with the same permissive rule of intersubstitution of material 
equivalents, we tumble into contradiction Fa ≠ Fa and Gb ≠ Gb, even 
before the inference proceeds first to deduce from [1] the ι-INTRO-
derived expansion of Fa, by which a = ιx[x = a ∧ Fa]. It is supposed to 
be exactly here that the identity statement exposes a proposition in the Fa 
conjunct of the identity statement, for replacement by any other material 
equivalent, thereby linking the truth-maker of Fa to that of any materially 
equivalent proposition Gb. The objection is that Neale’s argument is 
embroiled in contradiction with the universal reflexivity of identity 
already in assumptions [1]-[3], prior to ι-INTRO being brought into play. 
Insofar as Neale accurately presents the logical structure of the slingshot, 
it appears that the argument embodies logically inconsistent assumptions, 
even independently of the slingshot’s main contradiction-driven reductio 
ad absurdum. As such, the slingshot cannot possibly represent, as it is 
sometimes portrayed, a sound refutation of that version of the 
correspondence theory of truth according to which distinct propositions 
are supposed to be made true by distinct truth-making facts or states of  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Dale Jacquette
affairs. The paradox suggests that there are even greater difficulties in the 
standard package of assumptions about propositions, their identity 
conditions, and especially about the extensionality of identity and 
nonidentity assertions. 
The slingshot argument is interesting because it provides a litmus test for 
intensionalist-extensionalist leanings in logic and philosophical 
semantics. If you think that there is nothing logically wrong with the 
slingshot, and you are prepared to accept and build meaningful 
conclusions on it, then you may be somewhat of a radical extensionalist. 
If, on the contrary, despite your general open-mindedness, you think that 
slingshot inferences must be logically or materially faulty, and that in 
principle it should only be a technical question of discovering exactly 
where and how they go wrong, then at heart you are likely to be some 
kind of intensionalist in philosophical logic and semantics. 
Extensionalism is renowned for distinguishing propositional and fact 
identities in a rather coarse-grained way. There is nevertheless no reason 
even on radically extensionalist principles to suppose that the slingshot 
argument absurdly implies the collapse of all truth-making facts into a 
Parmenidean One, a single dense fact as the unified unarticulated ‘truth-
maker’ for all true propositions. If the slingshot argument were sound, 
then the correspondence theory of truth would not be the only victim of 
its marksmanship, but the argument would evidently constitute the most 
decisive single-handed refutation of extensionalist semantics. 
Another way to make the same criticism, if part only by force of 
repetition in different format, is to emphasize the fact that the slingshot is 
meant to follow a certain inferential progression. The difference this time 
is that we shall ignore the contradiction implicit already in assumptions 
(1)-(3). We take the opportunity to make explicit Neale’s use of 
introduction and elimination principles for the definite descriptor, which 
he presents in (vii) ι-INTRO and (viii) ι-ELIM rules:  7
1. Fa     Assumption 
2. Gb     Assumption 
3. a ≠ b     Assumption 
4. Fa ↔ Gb     (1,2 elementary logic) 
5. a = ιx[x = a ∧ Fa]    (1 (vii) ι-INTRO) 
6. b = ιx[x = b ∧ Gb]   (2 (vii) ι-INTRO) 
7. [a = a = a ∧ Fa] ↔ Fa    (5 (viii) ι-ELIM) 
8. [a = a = a ∧ Fa] ↔ Gb   (4,7 elementary logic)  
12
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The obvious question is, Where is there to go after (8), when a = a = a 
drops out as a necessary consequence of the reflexivity of identity? What 
more of interest can be deduced, except that Fa ↔ Gb, from (7) and (8), 
which is already explicit in (4)? Nor does the argument begin to suggest 
how any of these facts, undisputed in themselves, are supposed to qualify 
Gb as the truth-maker of ‘Fa’, or the reverse. We know that the slingshot 
inference is an artifact of a mistaken use of formalism, when we 
reformulate the essential assumption [5] as: 
[5'] a = ιx[x = a ∧ Fa]  
From this we can validly instantiate: 
[5''] a = a = a ∧ Fa 
Which is to say, discounting necessary identities as contributing nothing 
to the proposition’s truth conditions, simply Fa. If we assume that the left 
conjunct is a = a = a, and that it drops out as guaranteed to be true by the 
universal reflexivity of identity, then we are right back where we started 
following Neale’s progression, with predication Fa. We can perform this 
transformation of syntax endlessly, shifting back and forth by means of 
Neale’s ι-INTRO and ι-ELIM principles, without further substantive 
results. We shall merely change a form of expression from one mode to 
another and back again, without arriving at any moment in the process at 
any implications whatever, ontically comforting or otherwise, concerning 
the truth-makers of either Fa or Gb. 
Alternatively, among choices we have already explored in other ways and 
found grounds for rejecting, the inference might be parsed as a = Fa. 
This, after desperate search, may appear to be the syntactically most 
sensible, perhaps the only possible, way to understand the construction. 
Unfortunately, it also disappoints. Since it is assumed to be true as part of 
the problem that Fa, the putative identity statement so construed makes 
no sense, unless a is itself a predication, such that Fa → FFa. If Fa, and 
a = Fa, then it is already unavoidably true that FFa. If it is not true or 
even intelligible that FFa, then it is not the case that a = Fa, and most 
logicians would sleep at night. The consequent is not standardly 
interpreted, let alone as true, and it appears to violate simple type theory 
restrictions against iterative predicative constructions of identical type. It 
can only be the case that FFa, if a is the predication of property F to a 
itself, and if the predication of property F to object a has the property F 
of being a predication, although not a predication in such iteration 
directly to or of object a. The question is not whether such nestings of 
predications F, FF, and perhaps more, can be truly instantiated, but 
whether when they are instantiated they can truly be identical to object a. 
The predications in question are anyway germane to metalogic and 
metasemantics, rather than to the truth-maker conditions of ordinary 
predications, such as ‘The flower is a red rose’. We cannot expect 
semantics to avail itself of the most questionable predicational structures  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for such elementary truth-value vehicles, merely for the sake of 
preserving a still more questionable slingshot objection to a 
correspondence truth-maker semantics that is otherwise minding its own 
business. 
Thus, coming to terms with Neale’s ι-INTRO, we are back to the riddle 
of the slingshot argument equivalence of trying to identify a pig with a 
pig plus a cow. How can any object a be identified as both itself and its 
possession of one of its constitutive properties? It is enough that a = a. If 
Fa, then the definitely described object with that distinctive property of a 
having property F cannot be identical with a. The reason is the seasoned 
consideration that whereas objects have properties, they are not, in 
possessing them, identical to the properties they possess. I may have the 
property of being a horseman or of being a rational animal, but if I can no 
longer ride or reason, it will be I who have lost these properties, and 
therefore I possessing property F cannot be identical with the having of 
property F, even if F is the totality of all the essential properties I 
possess. The only relief for the application of Neale’s ι-INTRO principle 
is if a happens to be a predication, and F is the property of being a 
predication (throughout, of a property to an object), so that Fa means 
truly that a is a predication, and FFa truly means that it is a predication to 
say that Fa, that a is a F-predication. It is also assumed without further 
ado that a ≠ b and that Gb. Surely, on reflection, none of these facts are 
enough individually or collectively to make random existent state of 
affairs Gb a truth-maker of ‘Fa’. 
Were that sufficient, we could manufacture the semantic absurdity of a 
‘slingshot’ paradox for any truth-maker theory of truth we liked (and of 
truth-breakers for falsehoods), merely from the otherwise harmless 
assumptions that Fa and Fa ↔ Gb. The truth-maker of ‘Fa’ is E, Fa ↔ 
Gb; therefore, the truth-maker of ‘Gb’ is E. That substitution has 
obviously gone awry. It is unlicensed on interchangeability salva veritate 
grounds, indicated syntactically by its need to transact the crucial 
substitution within an intensional quotation, rather than intersubstitution-
supporting extensional, context. Truth-makers are associated in truth-
maker semantics with mentioned ‘Fa’, not with used Fa predications. 
Mentioning linguistic contexts, also for purposes of slingshot inferences, 
are intensional, referentially opaque, and impenetrable to intersubstitution 
of coreferential singular terms or materially equivalent propositions salva 
veritate. 
The further implication is that all truth-maker correlation expressions are 
intensional. To say “The truth-maker of ‘p’ = X”, and that p ↔ q, 
therefore, “The truth-maker of ‘q’ = X”, is to attempt an intensional 
fallacy involving a substitution of materially equivalent propositions in 
an intensional context that is authorized exclusively for purely 
extensional contexts. To speak of a sentence’s or proposition’s truth-
maker (or more generally of its truth conditions) is to say something more  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intensionally fine-grained involving the most scrupulous application of 
Leibnizian identity requirements, than is available by such crude truth-
functional devices as material equivalence. There appears no basis for 
suggesting that Gb could be a truth-maker for Fa or conversely, merely 
because they both share the truth-value True (T). That meager fact is 
nonetheless the sole justification for their intersubstitution in the 
slingshot argument. It appears that the slingshot inference is virtually 
played out of options by which to advance a plausible embarrassment for 
truth-maker semantics. !
6. Slingshot Variation Defense !
We might wonder whether the slingshot by proceeding in another way 
could not gain traction without engendering the logical contradiction that 
plagues the original version. Perhaps the assumptions in the customary 
slingshot are unnecessarily strong. We could accordingly try: 
(4*) β = ιx[x = a ∧ p] 
(5*) β = ιx[x = a ∧ q]     (as in (5)) 
(6*) ιx[x = a ∧ p] = ιx[x = a ∧ q]   (as in (6)) 
The revised argument does not support the inference to p = q after step 
(6*), unfortunately, as it does when relying on the original (6). The fact 
that β = a is not trivial implies that it does not cancel out of the 
extensionally identical definitely described objects in (6*) in the manner 
of the trivial truth-maker for a = a in (6). We obtain instead in that case 
only [β = a ∧ p] = [β = a ∧ q]. From this logical nontriviality, we cannot 
immediately eliminate β = a, and we are prevented thereby from reducing 
the above identity extensionally to the equivalent of the proposition that 
the truth-maker of p = the truth-maker of q. Rather, the truth-maker of β 
= a remains nontrivially on both sides of the main identity relation, and 
cannot drop out without excuse to leave the truth-maker of p = the truth-
maker of q. 
In this variation of the slingshot argument, we do not have the equivalent 
implicitly of parsing [β = a] ∧ p, but rather throughout of β = [a ∧ p]. The 
main difficulty with the latter parsing is that it implies that: (A) a, 
surprisingly, is a proposition that can be conjoined with other 
propositions like p, and that, even more astonishingly, (B) it follows that 
a = [a ∧ a] (not to be confused with a ↔ [a ∧ a]). Whereas, there seems 
no reason why any friend or foe of extensionalism should care if the 
truth-maker of proposition α is identical to the truth-maker of the 
logically equivalent conjunction, a ∧ a. Is that the slingshot’s best effort? 
If we are permitted to begin only with the nontrivial informative or 
significant true identity statement that β = a, then there is no deductively  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valid passage to p = q, or to the slingshot’s threatened conclusion that the 
truth-maker of random p = the truth-maker of random q. 
A dilemma that parallels the objection to the original slingshot is that 
either β = a, in which case we are back with the same problem as the 
original version of the slingshot. Or β ≠ a, from which we cannot 
possibly detach the only relevant truth-maker as identical for the truth of 
both true propositions p and q, in trying to advance beyond (6*). It is hard 
to imagine how such logically exhaustive and tightly mutually exclusive 
‘realist’ choices at the base and conclusion of both dilemma horns could 
be nullified by any available parsings of essential slingshot assumption 
(4). The dilemma adds another burden to the classical slingshot argument 
that collectively begin to erode away all the argument’s typically 
presumed meaning, motivation and force. The viability of slingshot 
reasoning is not improving. !
7. Streamlined Slingshot to Demonstrate the Intensionality of 
Identity !
It appears logically possible for propositions p and q to have the same 
truth-maker even if they are distinct. If, on the contrary, p and q have 
different truth-makers, then they evidently cannot be identical 
propositions, and we must conclude in this second dilemma horn that in 
that case, p ≠ q. From p ≠ q and p ↔ q, however, it immediately follows 
by substitution of equivalents p ↔ q in the purely extensional nonidentity 
context p ≠ q, that p ≠ p and q ≠ q. The argument, an even more compact 
reformulation of the classical slingshot, has this form: 
Suppose that proposition p is true and proposition q is true, and 
that they are different propositions, p ≠ q.  
Let p be the true proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Snow is 
white’, for example, and q the manifestly distinct true proposition 
expressed by the sentence ‘Grass is green’.  
From p ∧ q, assuming that both propositions are true, it follows by 
truth table definitions of the propositional connectives that 
materially p ↔ q.  
We are authorized to uniformly intersubstitute material or logical 
equivalents in any purely extensional context, salva veritate. 
Assume for the sake of argument, and, ultimately, as a hypothesis 
for reductio ad absurdum, that identity, and hence also nonidentity 
expressions are purely extensional, or at least that the above 
nonidentity statement, p ≠ q, is purely extensional.  
Under these assumptions, and from p ≠ q and p ↔ q in particular, 
we can immediately derive p ≠ p and q ≠ q, contradicting the 
conventional assumption of the reflexivity of identity.  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The argument can also be more rigorously presented:  
Background assumptions: 
(E) = and ≠ are purely extensional relations, in the sense that their 
corresponding expressive linguistic contexts in such identity 
and nonidentity statements as a = a, a = β and a ≠ β support 
the intersubstitution of coreferential terms and materially 
equivalent propositions salva veritate.  (Extensionality of =) 
(R) ∀x[x = x]      (Universal Reflexivity of =) 
Modified slingshot counterexample to extensionality of = and ≠: 
(1) p = Snow is white.    (Stipulation) 
(2) q = Grass is green.     (Stipulation) 
(3) p ≠ q 
—————————————- 
(4) p ∧ q     (Truth of (1) and (2)) 
(5) p ↔ q         (From (4) in standard propositional logic) 
(6) p ≠ p ∧ q ≠ q       ((3),(5),(E)) 
Together with background assumption (R), we finally produce a 
reductio of background assumption (E): 
(7) p = p          (R) 
(8) NOT-(E): = and ≠ are not purely extensional relations, in the 
sense that their corresponding expressive linguistic contexts in 
such identity and nonidentity statements as a = a, a = β and a 
≠ β do not support the intersubstitution of coreferential terms 
and materially equivalent propositions salva veritate. 
        ((E),(6),(7) Reductio ad absurdum) 
If we assume as standardly that identity is a minimally reflexive relation, 
then we can mount a more comprehensive version of the slingshot 
argument that also covers but is not limited to definite description 
formulations. Shall we accept the conclusion that identity is an 
intensional rather than extensional relation? Or argue that the conclusion 
is an insufferable paradox, blatantly at odds with the intuitively obvious 
and logically indispensable truth that identity is extensional, and, indeed, 
that identity is an extensional relation par excellence? 
The slingshot is not generally presented as a logical antinomy, but more 
conservatively as a logically consistent refutation of the correspondence 
theory of truth, contradicting the proposition that every distinct true 
proposition corresponds to a distinct truth-making state of affairs. The 
present objection proves that slingshot assumption (4) must finally be 
false, and hence that the argument does not soundly support an 
identification of the truth-makers of arbitrary distinct but jointly true and  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hence materially equivalent propositions. If, contrariwise, slingshot step 
(4) is not meant to be true by stipulation, if it is simply an expression that 
could just as well be false, and if indeed it is demonstrably false, as we 
have just seen, then the slingshot argument so interpreted and applied 
does not represent sound reasoning undermining the correspondence 
theory of truth by conflating the truth-makers of every true proposition 
into an unarticulated single massive truth-making state of affairs. 
The only obvious solutions to the paradoxical implications generated 
within the reductio and based on its hypothesis are: 
(i) Denying the assumption that p ≠ q, insisting that the 
proposition expressed by the sentence ‘Grass is green’ is after 
all identical to the proposition expressed by the sentence 
‘Snow is white’. 
(ii) Undoing the elementary propositional logic and classical truth 
table definitions of the truth functional connectives by which a 
conjunction logically implies a biconditional or logical 
equivalence. 
(iii)Denying the assumption that identity and nonidentity contexts 
like p = q and p ≠ q are considered to be purely extensional, 
and acknowledging instead that identities are always 
intensional expressions that do not support intersubstitution of 
coreferential terms or logically equivalent sentences salva 
veritate. 
Of these choices, and it is not clear that there are any others, (iii) is 
clearly preferable. It implies the independently supportable classification 
of identity and nonidentity contexts as intensional rather than purely 
extensional, given that Leibnizian property-based identity conditions are 
for that reason alone rightly categorized as intensional. An intensional 
semantics ontically prioritizes properties over objects and defines 
particular objects as having particular combinations of properties. 
Whereas an extensional semantics ontically prioritizes objects over their 
properties, and therefore acknowledges only existent objects, whose 
properties are given extensionally by virtue of inclusion in or exclusion 
from the extension of all existent objects with just those properties. 
We can say in independent support of (iii) that in the relevant sense any 
foundationally property-based Leibnizian identity principles are by 
definition intensional. They stand in marked contrast to the existent 
object ontic prioritizing of an extensionalist semantics in which objects 
come before their properties, and the only theoretical burden is to offer 
set theoretical conditions for the truth-makers of propositions asserting 
that an object has or objects have a certain property, their inclusion in or 
exclusion from the extension of all those existent objects with exactly 
that property. The truth is that where identity conditions for objects are 
concerned, extensionalists generally accept Leibnizian property-based  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identity principles. They typically do so, however, without realizing or in 
any case without acknowledging that in so doing they have contaminated 
their effort at maintaining a pure logical and semantic extensionalism 
with a healthy dose of intensionalism at the very logical core of their 
supposedly purely extensionalist semantics. They do not inquire as to 
what they are philosophically committing themselves to by adopting the 
Leibnizian identity of indiscernibles or indiscernibility of identicals as 
identity conditions for the existent objects on which any extensionalist 
semantics ultimately depends. 
The solution in (i), besides being counterintuitive, trivializes all slingshot 
inferences. Slingshots have interest and force only if there are multiple 
distinct true propositions that a slingshot is able to prove surprisingly 
have the same truth-maker. If p = q, if the proposition expressed by the 
sentence that ‘Snow is white’ is identical after all to the proposition 
expressed by the sentence that ‘Grass is green’, then there is nothing 
paradoxical about their having the same truth-maker. 
Solution (ii) is drastic, and in a sense just as soundly breaks the back of 
extensionalism at another vertebra than accepting the proposal in (iii). 
The proposition that identity and nonidentity contexts are intensional is 
perfectly in keeping with the distinction between extensionality and 
intensionality, whereby what is extensional is ultimately logically and 
ontically committal (existent) object-prioritizing, and what is intensional 
is ultimately logically and ontically neutral property-prioritizing. 
Leibniz’s law in both its component conditions is by this distinction 
evidently intensional, identifying and individuating objects by virtue of 
their possession of a distinctive set of constitutive properties. The 
metasemantic proposition, “The truth-maker of ‘p’ = X” is intensional, 
partly and as a failsafe, because ‘p’ in single mentioning-citation quotes 
does not admit equivalents salva veritate, but also because the identity = 
relation and its expressive linguistic contexts is always intensional. The 
same can be said for the intensionality attributed to modal contexts by 
Quine in this formulation of his famous example: 
(Q1) The number of planets = 9. 
(Q2) ◻(9 > 7)  
——————————————- 
(Q3) ◻(The number of planets > 7) 
Intensionality there may be somewhere in assumptions (Q1) or (Q2). It 
looks superficially, moreover, as though substitution failure salva veritate 
can only be laid at the door of assumption (Q2). The explicitly modal 
context into which the intersubstitution of ‘The number of planets’ for ‘9’ 
in (Q2) is attempted on the strength of the identity in (Q1), appears on the 
usual background assumptions how it is that we can proceed by 
syntactical substitution from true assumptions to a false conclusion. If the  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identity context in (Q1) is intensional, however, as argued, then there is 
an alternative explanation for the substitution failure in (Q3), involving 
the intensionality or referential opacity of identity = contexts, rather than 
of modal ◻ contexts. !
8. Philosophical Implications of Classical and Streamlined Slingshots !
The further conclusion of this style of argument is to prove that identity is 
intensional rather than purely extensional. The following paradox is 
inspired by but appears logically far more toxic and at the same time 
more minimal than the slingshot argument.  
Suppose that proposition p is true and proposition q is true, and that they 
are different propositions, p ≠ q. Perhaps p is the true proposition that 
Snow is white, and q is the presumably distinct true proposition that 
Grass is green. From p ∧ q it follows by truth table definitions of the 
propositional connectives that materially, p ↔ q. We are authorized to 
uniformly intersubstitute logical or material equivalents in any purely 
extensional context, salva veritate. So, we assume for the sake of 
argument, and, finally, as a hypothesis for reductio, that identity and 
nonidentity expressions are purely extensional, or at least that the above 
nonidentity statement, p ≠ q, is purely extensional. Under these 
assumptions, from p ≠ q and p ↔ q, we can once again immediately 
derive the unwanted conclusions p ≠ p and q ≠ q, contradicting universal 
reflexivity of identity assumptions.  
The proposition that identity and nonidentity contexts are intensional is 
perfectly in keeping with the distinction between the extensional and 
intensional, whereby what is extensional is ultimately logically and 
ontically object-prioritizing, whereas what is intensional is ultimately 
logically and ontically property-prioritizing. The stripped-down version 
of the slingshot construed as a reductio of the assumption that identity is 
extensional, leaves us with the comfortable conclusion that identity 
conditions formulated as variations of Leibniz’s Law effectively define 
objects by defining their identity conditions in terms of properties. To do 
so is necessarily to logically and ontically prioritize properties over 
objects, which is the hallmark of intensionalism. Identity, like reference, 
predication, and quantification, accordingly joins the list of intensional 
rather than purely extensional logical and semantic relations in a 
comprehensive philosophical logic.  8!
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philosophical conference, Crossing Borders, Austrian Society for Philosophy, Vienna, 
Austria, June 2-4, 2011. I am grateful to participants at the session for useful comments 
and criticisms, and to an anonymous journal referee who provided valuable suggestions 
leading to the essay’s improvement.
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